Stonewall Jackson Essay
& # 8217 ; s 1862 Valley Campaign Essay, Research PaperMany traits are associated with Thomas Jonathan Jackson and hisleading in the Confederacy. He is known for blunt finding, militarymastermind beyond all others, and the ability to turn any ground forces into a active machine.Jackson became legendary when a South Carolina general, seeking to beat up hisain work forces at Bull Run, pointed to Jackson and shouted, ? Look, there is Jacksonand his work forces standing like a rock wall against the enemy.
? Therefore he everlastinglybecame? Stonewall? Jackson. Jackson? s military bequest had begun even beforethis minute, when he diverted 20,000 northern military personnels in the Shenendoah Valleyof Virginia, with merely 7,000 military personnels of him ain. The image of Stonewall Jacksonhas everlastingly been one of the most absorbing associated with Civil War militaryoperation.
However, the true military mastermind of Jackson lies in his apprehension ofmotion in war. He could steer a brigade under the olfactory organ of opposingground forcess, process his work forces farther and faster than anyone before, and understoodthe critical importance of railwaies to the war attempt. Using all these techniques,he single-handedly distracted much of the Union force headed to Richmond( including McClellan ) . The operations of Jackson in the Shenendoah during theforemost half of the twelvemonth 1862 constitute one of the most superb episodes of militarymotion in history and go on to be a criterion for military survey today.Get downing with the Battle of Kernstown on March 23 and stoping with theBattle of Fort Republic on June 9, Stonewall Jackson produced the individualgreatest military operation in the Civil War. The about impossible Marches, theincredible lickings of ground forcess triple the size of his ain, and the uninterruptedconfusion the Union faced made his manoeuvres legendary. Two factors gavethe part military value. The Army of Northern Virginia was about dependenton its agricultural merchandises.
And secondly, it became a fortress that had to beoccupied to progress into Virginia ( specifically Richmond ) [ Appendix A ] .Jackson recognized that this vale was the key to military motion, andmilitary domination, in the eastern theatre.Soon after the conflict of Bull Run? Jackson was promoted to command theValley District of Virginia. ? 1 His bid revolved entirely around theShenendoah, of which the Union forces held Romney and the north side of thePotomac. Jackson had merely a little regiment at his disposal to seek and recoverthis district. The run had no unequivocal beginning, but the motionduring the month of March signaled the first action. On March 23 at Kernstown,Jackson was handed his merely? loss? when he battled Nathaniel Banks and his9000 work forces with less than 3000 of his ain work forces. Jackson? s regiment was routed,but the conflict caused Banks to prorogue his move on Washington, therefore? stop deadinga big organic structure of brotherhood military personnels in the vale? 2.
Furthermore, it? convinced PresidentLincoln that Jackson? s ground forces could be cut of and destroyed. ? 3 He now retired upthe vale. He appeared all of a sudden at McDowell on May 8 and sent a Federalforce on retreat. One Confederate officer recalled the effects of the conflict:? Jackson? s prompt action and bold onslaught had wholly changed McClellan? sprograms, and alternatively of set uping Banks near Manassas, he ordered him toremain in the vale, and even sent [ supports ] , to assistance in driving backJackson? .4? Marching with the velocity that earned his military personnels the moniker the? pes horse? he attacked and defeated a little brotherhood fort at Front Royal? 5and so fell upon Bank? s withdrawing chief ground forces at Winchester on May 25. Herehe defeated 64,000 military personnels with his ain 17,000 by flanking his place in themetropolis. Stonewall Jackson? s little vale ground forces had? turned the tabular arraies on Banks andthe Washington authorities, and now held control of the full Shenendoah. ? 6Threatened by Jackson? s close propinquity to Washington, Lincoln divertedFederal military personnels to environ his ground forces.
Jackson watched three Federal columnsconverge to destruct him, but narrowly escaped by falling back on Harper? s Ferryon May 31, coercing portion of his ground forces to process 50 stat mis in two yearss to evade thetrap. Jackson continued to retreat up the vale with Union forces in hotchase. Jackson foresaw the two Federal columns? meeting on PortRepublic ; hence, he concentrated forces at that place and maintain Fremont and Shieldsseparated. General Richard Ewell held off Fremont? s forces at Cross Keys toallow Jackson clip to be after a work stoppage. Jackson? s forces crossed the ShenendoahRiver and attacked Shields on June 9. After a barbarous conflict, the Federal soldiers wererouted and retreated northerly, go forthing Jackson? maestro of the Valley. ? 7 He had? thwarted every Union attempt made against him.
? 8 He did so through acombination of difficult Marches, cognition of terrain, unexpected tactics,straightforwardness of intent, heavy onslaughts concentrated at one point, and egoassurance originating from the idea that God was on his side. However,Jackson? s mob is explained best by his ain words to an officer at the conflict ofCross Keys:Always mystify, mislead, and surprise the enemy, if possible.And when you strike and overcome him, ne’er allow up in the chaseso long as your work forces have strength to follow. Such tactics winevery clip, and a little ground forces may therefore destruct a big one initem, and repeated triumph will do it invincible.
9Adroitly put to deathing his sharp military mind, Jackson had? occupiedabout 60,000 military personnels in the bootless attempt to convey him to bay. ? 10These motions had a profound impact on the Civil War, holding bothimmediate and permanent effects. The most obvious consequence is the recreation Jacksoncaused on Union forces heading toward Richmond. Becuase of Jackson? smotions, Lincoln dispatched 20,000 military personnels to look into him. While these military personnelswere on there manner, Jackson stealthily slipped between them and stationed atAshland, straight north of the capital. ? Protecting Richmond was the key toConfederate success? 11, and Jackson preserved its safety with his motionsin the Valley.Each conflict in the run had strong branchings that were felt inWashington and throughout the Union.
The bold onslaught on Kernstown, thoughunsuccessful, led to many of import consequences. The first consequence was the callback ofFederal military personnels from Manassas to the Valley by the request of General Shields.He explained the logical thinking behind this move stating, ? Though the conflict hadbeen won, I still could non believe Jackson would hold [ smitten ] so far from thechief organic structure without supports ; so to be prepared for such a eventuality, Iset to convey together all the military personnels within my range. ? 12 Therefore a organic structure of 20,000military personnels was thought necessary to guard against Jackson? s 3000 and thefanciful supports. McClellan was besides deprived of 10,000 work forces in hisbid that were placed supporting against Jackson.
And eventually Lincoln feltso insecure over the defence of Washington, that he ordered McDowell? s fullcorps to be added to 70,000 already in defence, instead than allowing them helpMcClellan. Therefore by striking to forestall General Johnston from go forthing theValley, Jackson had accomplished much more than he expected. His? hocus-pocus?had achieved wholly he could hold hoped for.At the tactical degree, the conflict of McDowelcubic decimeter can be viewed as a draw.However, strategically it was a superb success for Jackson and the South.Through the usage of terrain and leading, Jackson demonstrated his ability toconcentrate his work forces against a smaller subdivision of the resistance, without allowingthe resistance dressed ore against him. The intelligence of Banks licking here causedthe Federal authorities to name upon all the provinces to direct reserves to protectWashington against the chase. Jackson was demoing the Union that theConfederate states was non traveling to be easy defeated.
He carried the impulse ofthis win to Front Royal and Winchester subsequently in the month.At Front Royal and Winchester the Federal forces came to larn that? Jackson was non to be caught by any of the combination of motions theycould convey approximately. ? 13 While it was true he had merely a one-fourth of the work forcesconcentrating on his rear, he had no uncertainty of the ability to split these forcesand run into them on his ain evidences with superior tactical strength.The conflict of Cross Keys signaled the terminal of the run with the terminal ofthe chase on Jackson. Here he brightly defeated two detached ground forcess underthe bid of Fremont and Shields by deft maneuvering and clever usage ofterrain.
With this dual triumph, Jackson ended his run and was free toarticulation Lee at Seven Pines.In this exciting months run, Jackson made great gaining controls of shopsand captives ; but this was non the main consequence. Without deriving a individual tacticaltriumph, he had achieved a great strategic triumph, for by skilfully traveling his15,000 work forces, he had neutralized a force of 60,000.
It is possibly non excessively much tostate that he saved Richmond, for he had caused McClellan? s forces to be greatlydiverted to the Valley and non concentrated on Richmond.However, this recreation was non the end of Jackson when he entered theValley. Jackson saw the Shenendoah as the line of life of the Confederacy.
It wasthe clearest way to Richmond from the North, contained many agriculturalmerchandises, and was the location of many train lines that fed the Confederatemilitary personnels. Crucial to understanding the importance of the Valley to Jackson werethe railwaies. The B & A ; O, W & A ; P, and more significantly the Manassas GapRailroad all ran through some portion of the vale [ Appendix B ] . Jacksonunderstood the analogue between triumph on the tracks and triumph in the war.The Manassas Gap Railroad can easy be called the? meatline on theConfederate states. ? 14 Along its paths were found the largest meat wadding works inthe Confederacy and three terminals of shops that fed the largest subdivision of military personnels.It was the most normally used rail to transport freshly geting soldiers into theground forces every bit good.
In the spring of 1862, Union forces were shuting in on the paths,and? merely such Confederates as Lee and Jackson understood the magnitude ofthe loss. ? 15Jackson besides understood the importance that motion of suppliesplayed in the North. The Baltimore and Ohio Railroad was a? regular mark forJackson? s work forces who smashed its paths and took its supplies.
? 16 It was one ofhis precious aims to destruct that railway and reclaim northwesternVirginia.During the full run, Banks was having his supplies on theManassas Gap and so holding them carted to him. ? Jackson reasoned that ifthe route were cut at Front Royal, Banks would be forced to trust on a long waggondraw from Winchester ; that such a supply would be so vulnerable to cavalryforaies, ? 17 he could coerce Banks to fall back down the vale. He calculated thatby utilizing the Massanuttens as a barrier he could fleetly take the rail at FrontRoyal before Banks became cognizant of the intent. He swept out of the forests,and routed the Federal military personnels left to guard the railway, go forthing Banks cut offfrom his supply line. Jackson? s recapture of the small town and railroad spelledcatastrophe for Banks. He could now easy dispel Banks back to Winchester andout of the Potomac wholly.
Clearly? Stonewall Jackson knew how to utilize arailway? to get away winning against larger enemies.On May 19th Jackson had began his valley campaign-a run thatresulted in superb success for the Southern cause. With the licking of Fremonton June 8th and Shields on 9th, he had been on March for 23 yearss ; covered 200stat mis ; had McDowell? s? forces from Fredericksburg rerouted ; had seized valuablesupplies at Front Royal, Winchester, and Martinsburg, and, although surroundedby 60,000 work forces, had escaped the traps set for him and brought place captivesand captured goods. And he had done this with a relatively little loss ofwork forces. The Battle of Port Republic was his most dearly-won triumph, but its consequences wereso superb that it was a fitting stopping point to a scene of warfare that will populate in historywith the great runs of the universe. It raised the celebrity of Jackson to thehighest pinnacle of military fame, giving him a place among the greatestsoldiers of the age.The conflicts of Jackson? s Valley Campaign are known to pupils of thewar, non merely in the United States, but across the universe.
General NormanShwarzkopf late cited Jackson? s run as one of the guiding visible radiationsbehind his scheme in the Middle East. Field Marshall Erwin Rommel visited thevale and followed in Jackson? s footfalls through the vale to understand themastermind behind it. The military accomplishments which Stonewall Jackson used in theShenendoah Valley run have been analyzed and studied by war historiographersfor coevalss in hopes of reiterating the superb executing.Many future military leaders used Jackson as a footing for their bid.In England, from 1875 on, many officers were expected to read theautobiography of Stonewall Jackson, with particular accent on the Shenendoahin order to larn? a right application of scheme of interior lines. ? 18 ErwinRommel, commanding officer of the German forces in Africa, used the Valley Campaignto larn to successfully get the better of ground forcess larger in size.
Clearly, StonewallJackson? s bequest in the vale lives on forever.Jackson? s glare in the Shenendoah is straight linked to hisconsummate apprehension of the fact that to win in war is to understand themotions of war. By processing his work forces under the olfactory organ of other commanding officers,insulating smaller subdivisions of ground forcess that could easy be defeated, capitalising onrailwaies chances, understanding the necessary subdivisions that the brotherhoodmust go to assail, and assailing the right subdivisions of the vale, Stonewallhad developed a military acumen that was unprecedented. In a affair of a shortclip since registration into the Confederacy, Robert E. Lee and he werecommanding the destiny of the war despite Federal advantages in industry, railwaies,work forces, and supplies.
With Jackson? s decease at Chancellorsville, many believe thehopes of a southern triumph died. Jackson had shown that military mastermind canlicking superior Numberss repeatedly, but the decease of the consummatecommanding officer caused the South to lose its greatest hope.Historians and war experts agree that Jackson? s Valley run of 1862is one of the greatest illustrations of military motion in history. However,Jackson would non take recognition for the superb disturbances and triumphs stating merely,? God has been our shield, and to his name be all the glorification. ? 19
