This qualification reflects the role of individuals who coordinate and maintain the OHS program within an organisation. Individuals would possess a sound theoretical knowledge base and use a range of specialised, technical or managerial competencies to plan, carry out and evaluate their own work and the work of others with safety responsibilities. Job Roles • OHS/WHS Manager • OHS/WHS Practitioner • Senior OHS/WHS Officer. About this Learner Guide This learner guide is designed to be used in conjunction with your assessment workbooks and provides the general information that you will need to complete BSB5130 however there may be instances where you will need to conduct research to gain additional evidence that may be required.
The information provided is provided in 9 sections (1 general OHS/WHS section and 8 unit by unit sections). The units and subjects addressed in this learner guide are: General OHS/WHS general OHS/WHS knowledge to assist with underpinning knowledge BSBOHS501B Participate in the coordination and maintenance of a systematic approach to managing OHS BSBOHS502B Participate in the management of the OHS information and data systems BSBOHS503B Assist in the design and development of OHS participative arrangements BSBOHS504B Apply principles of OHS risk management BSBOHS505B Manage hazards in the work environment BSBOHS508B Participate in the investigation of incidents BSBOHS509A Ensure a safe workplace BSBADM502B Manage meetings Index SECTION |ELEMENT | | |About the Diploma of OHS | | |About this learner guide | | |Disclosure | | |Piper Alpha | | |What is OHS | | |Glossary of Safety Terms | |G |GENERAL OHS INFORMATION | | |Occupational Health & Safety | | |OHS Acts Regulations and Codes of Practice | | |Duty of Care | | |Three Steps in Accident Prevention | | |Risk Management | | |What is a Hazard | | |What is a Risk | | |The Workplace Health and Safety Management Process | |1 |UNIT 1: BSBOHS501B: Participate in the coordination and maintenance of a systematic approach to managing OHS | | |
Element 1: Contribute to the strategic planning process | | |Element 2: Participate in the development of an OHS plan | | |Element 3: Support the implementation of the systematic approach to anaging OHS | | |Element 4: Provide advice to key personnel and stakeholders | | |Element 5: Participate in monitoring OHS | | |Element 6: Participate in reviewing the management of OHS | |2 |UNIT 2: BSBOHS502B: Participate in the management of the OHS information and data systems | | |Element 1: Access sources of OHS information and data | | |Element 2: Assist in the application of policies and procedures for collection of workplace information, data and | | |records | | |Element 3: Assist in maintaining information and data management systems that enable retrieval and distribution of OHS | | |information and data | | |Element 4: Participate in the analysis of information and data to identify trends and actions for prevention | | |Element 5: Communicate OHS information and results of data analysis to stakeholders and external bodies | | |Element 6: Communicate the effectiveness of OHS information and data systems through monitoring and evaluation | |3 |UNIT 3: BSBOHS503B: Assist in the design and development of OHS participative arrangements | | |Element 1. Identify the need for OHS participative arrangements | | |Element 2.
Assist in the design of participative arrangements | | |Element 3. Assist in developing participative arrangements | | |Element 4. Support the implementation of participative arrangements | | |Element 5. Evaluate the design and development of participative arrangement | |4 |UNIT 4: BSBOHS504B: Apply principles of OHS risk management | | |Element 1.
Access sources of information and data to identify hazards | | |Element 2. Analyse the work environment to identify hazards | | |Element 3. Assess risk associated with hazards | | |Element 4. Control risk associated with hazards | | |Element 5. Maintain hazard identification and risk control processes | | |Element 6.
Monitor and review risk management processes | |5 |UNIT 5: BSBOHS505C: Manage hazards in the work environment | | |Element 1. Access sources of information and data about the work environment to identify hazardous tasks or conditions | | |Element 2. Analyse the work environment to assess risk | | |Element 3. Control risk associated with hazard | | |Element 4. Monitor and review effectiveness of control strategy | | |Element 5.
Apply professional practice | |6 |UNIT 6: BSBOHS508B: Participate in the investigation of incidents | | |Element 1. Facilitate initial assessment of the situation | | |Element 2. Participate in the establishment of investigation processes | | |Element 3. Collect information and data for analysis | | |Element 4.
Analyse information and data gathered to identify immediate and underlying causes and practical prevention | | |measures | | |Element 5. Compile investigation report | |7 |UNIT 7: BSBOHS509A: Ensure a safe workplace | | |Element 1. Establish and maintain an OHS system | | |Element 2.
Establish and maintain participative arrangements for the management of OHS | | |Element 3. Establish and maintain procedures for identifying hazards, and assessing and controlling risks | | |Element 4. Establish and maintain a quality OHS management system | |8 |UNIT 8: BSBADM502B: Manage meetings | | |Element 1. Prepare for meetings | | |Element 2.
Conduct meetings | | |Element 3: Follow up meetings | INFORMATION IN THIS LEARNER GUIDE This learner guide has been compiled using a number of references and sources including: • Training. Gov (www. training. gov. au ) • Business Australia, OHS (http://www. business. gov. au/BusinessTopics/Occupationalhealthandsafety) • Wikipedia • Safety Line Institute • Safety Institute of Australia • Workplace Health and Safety QLD • Safe Work Victoria • Online dictionaries DISCLOSURE – SOURCE OF INFORMATION – PIPER ALPHA
Many of the assessment activities will be based on the real events of the Piper Alpha oil rig incident Information and videos on Piper Alpha is easily accessed via the internet, libraries, and other sources. The following timeline and information on Piper Alpha was sourced form Wikipedia as open source information on February 21 2011 under the Creative Comments Deed. Information on the Creative Comments Deed can be sourced at http://creativecommons. org/licenses/by-sa/3. 0/ PIPER ALPHA Piper Alpha was a North Sea oil production platform operated by Occidental Petroleum (Caledonia) Ltd. The platform began production in 1976, first as an oil platform and then later converted to gas production. An explosion and resulting fire destroyed it on July 6, 1988, killing 167 men, with only 59 survivors.
The death toll includes two crewmen of a rescue vessel.  Total insured loss was about ? 1. 7 billion (US$ 3. 4 billion). At the time of the disaster the platform accounted for approximately ten percent of North Sea oil and gas production, and was the worst offshore oil disaster in terms of lives lost and industry impact. Thirty bodies were not recovered. Piper oil field Four companies that later transformed into the OPCAL joint venture obtained an oil exploration licence in 1972 and discovered the Piper oilfield located at 58°28? N 0°15? E? / ? 58. 467°N 0. 25°E? / 58. 467; 0. 25 in early 1973 and commenced fabrication of the platform, pipelines and onshore support structures.
Oil production started in 1976 with about 250,000 barrels of oil per day increasing to 300,000 barrels (48,000 m3). A gas recovery module was installed by 1980. Production declined to 125,000 barrels (19,900 m3) by 1988. OPCAL built the Flotta oil terminal in the Orkney Islands to receive and process oil from the fields Piper, Claymore and Tartan, each with its own platform. One thirty inch (0. 762 m) diameter main oil pipeline ran 128 miles (206 kilometres) from Piper Alpha to Flotta, with a short oil pipeline from the Claymore platform joining it some twenty miles (32 km) to the west. The Tartan field also fed oil to Claymore and then onto the main line to Flotta.
Separate 46 cm diameter gas pipelines run from Piper to the Tartan platform, and from Piper to the gas compressing platform MCP-01 some 30 miles (48 km) to the Northwest. Construction A large fixed platform, Piper Alpha was situated on the Piper oilfield, approximately 120 miles (193 km) northeast of Aberdeen in 474 feet (144 m) of water, and comprised four modules separated by firewalls. The platform was constructed by McDermott Engineering at Ardersier and UIE at Cherbourg, with the sections united at Ardersier before tow out during 1975, with production commencing in late 1976. For safety reasons the modules were organised so that the most dangerous operations were distant from the personnel areas.
The conversion from oil to gas broke this safety concept, with the result that sensitive areas were brought together, for example the gas compression next to the control room, which played a role in the accident. It produced crude oil and natural gas from 24 wells for delivery to the Flotta oil terminal on Orkney and to other installations by three separate pipelines. It has been said[by whom? ] that at the time of the disaster, Piper was one of the heaviest platforms (along with Magnus and Brae B), operating in the North Sea. Timeline of the incident A new gas pipeline was built in the weeks before the 6 July explosion, and while this work disrupted the normal routine, the platform was operating as normal. The discovery of a small gas leak was not unusual and no cause for concern.
Because the platform was completely destroyed, and many of those involved died, analysis of events can only suggest a possible chain of events based on known facts. Some witnesses to the events question the official timeline. 12:00 p. m. Two condensate pumps, designated A and B, displaced the platform’s condensate for transport to the coast. On the morning of July 6, Pump A’s pressure safety valve (PSV #504) was removed for routine maintenance. The pump’s fortnightly overhaul was planned but had not started. The open condensate pipe was temporarily sealed with a blind flange (flat metal disc). Because the work could not be completed by 6:00 p. m. , the blind flange remained in place.
The on-duty engineer filled out a permit which stated that Pump A was not ready and must not be switched on under any circumstances. 6:00 p. m. The day shift ended, and the night shift started with 62 men running Piper Alpha. As he found the on-duty custodian busy, the engineer neglected to inform him of the condition of Pump A. Instead he placed the permit in the control centre and left. This permit disappeared and was not found. Coincidentally there was another permit issued for the general overhaul of Pump A that had not yet begun. 7:00 p. m. Like many other offshore platforms, Piper Alpha had an automatic fire-fighting system, driven by both diesel and electric pumps (the latter were disabled by the initial explosions).
The diesel pumps were designed to suck in large amounts of sea water for fire fighting; the pumps had an automatic control to start them in case of fire. However, the fire-fighting system was under manual control on the evening of July 6: Piper Alpha procedures required manual control of the pumps whenever divers were in the water (as they were for approximately 12 hours a day during summer) regardless of their location, to prevent divers from being sucked in with the sea water (fire pumps on other platforms were switched to manual control only if the divers were close to the inlet). 9:45 p. m. Condensate (natural gas liquids NGL) Pump B stopped suddenly and could not be restarted.
As the entire power supply of the offshore construction work depended on this pump, the manager had only a few minutes to bring the pump back online, otherwise the power supply would fail completely. A search was made through the documents to determine whether Condensate Pump A could be started. 9:52 p. m. The permit for the overhaul was found, but not the other permit stating that the pump must not be started under any circumstances due to the missing safety valve. The valve was in a different location from the pump and therefore the permits were stored in different boxes, as they were sorted by location. None of those present was aware that a vital part of the machine had been removed.
The manager assumed from the existing documents that it would be safe to start Pump A. The missing valve was not noticed by anyone, particularly as the metal disc replacing the safety valve was several metres above ground level and obscured by machinery. 9:55 p. m. Condensate Pump A was switched on. Gas flowed into the pump, and because of the missing safety valve, produced an overpressure which the loosely fitted metal disc did not withstand.  Gas audibly leaked out at high pressure, drawing the attention of several men and triggering six gas alarms including the high level gas alarm, but before anyone could act, the gas ignited and exploded, blowing through the firewall made up of 2. 5 x 1. metre panels bolted together, which were not designed to withstand explosions. The custodian pressed the emergency stop button, closing huge valves in the sea lines and ceasing all oil and gas production. Theoretically, the platform would then have been isolated from the flow of oil and gas and the fire contained. However, because the platform was originally built for oil, the firewalls were designed to resist fire rather than withstand explosions. The first explosion broke the firewall and dislodged panels around Module (B). One of the flying panels ruptured a small condensate pipe, creating another fire. 10:04 p. m. The control room was abandoned.
Piper Alpha’s design made no allowances for the destruction of the control room, and the platform’s organisation disintegrated. No attempt was made to use loudspeakers or to order an evacuation. Emergency procedures instructed personnel to make their way to lifeboat stations, but the fire prevented them from doing so. Instead the men moved to the fireproofed accommodation block beneath the helicopter deck to await further instructions. Wind, fire and smoke prevented helicopter landings and no further instructions were given, with smoke beginning to penetrate the personnel block. As the crisis mounted, two men donned protective gear in an attempt to reach the diesel pumping machinery below decks and activate the firefighting system. They were never seen again.
The fire would have burnt out were it not being fed with oil from both Tartan and the Claymore platforms, the resulting back pressure forcing fresh fuel out of ruptured pipework on Piper, directly into the heart of the fire. The Claymore continued pumping until the second explosion because the manager had no permission from the Occidental control centre to shut down. Also, the connecting pipeline to Tartan continued to pump, as its manager had been directed by his superior. The reason for this procedure was the exorbitant cost of such a shut down. It would have taken several days to restart production after a stop, with substantial financial consequences. Gas lines of 140 to 146 cm in diameter ran to Piper Alpha. Two years earlier Occidental management ordered a study, the results of which warned of the dangers of these gas lines.
Due to their length and diameter it would have taken several hours to reduce their pressure, so that it would not have been possible to fight a fire fuelled by them. Although the management admitted how devastating a gas explosion would be, Claymore and Tartan were not switched off with the first emergency call. 10:20 p. m. Tartan’s gas line (pressurised to 120 Atmospheres) melted and burst, releasing 15-30 tonnes of gas every second, which immediately ignited. A massive fireball 150 metres in diameter engulfed Piper Alpha, killing two crewmen on a fast rescue boat launched from the standby vessel Sandhaven and the six Piper Alpha crewmen they had rescued from the water. 10] From that moment on, the platform’s destruction was assured. 10:30 p. m. The Tharos, a large semi-submersible fire fighting, rescue and accommodation vessel, drew alongside Piper Alpha. The Tharos used its water cannons where it could, but it was restricted because the cannons were so powerful they would injure or kill anyone hit by the water. 10:50 p. m. The second gas line ruptured, spilling millions of litres of gas into the conflagration. Huge flames shot over 300 ft (90 m) in the air. The Tharos was driven off by the fearsome heat, which began to melt the surrounding machinery and steelwork. It was only after this second explosion that the Claymore stopped pumping oil.
Personnel still left alive were either desperately sheltering in the scorched, smoke-filled accommodation block or leaping from the deck some 200 ft (60 m) into the North Sea. 11:20 p. m. The pipeline connecting Piper Alpha to the Claymore Platform burst. 11:50 p. m. The generation and utilities Module (D), which included the fireproofed accommodation block, slipped into the sea. The largest part of the platform followed it. 12:45 a. m. , July 7 The entire platform had gone. Module (A) was all that remained of Piper Alpha. At the time of the disaster 224 people were on the platform; 165 died and 59 survived. ] Two men from the Standby Vessel Sandhaven were also killed.
Aftermath There is controversy about whether there was sufficient time for more effective emergency evacuation. People were still getting off the platform several hours after the initial fires and explosions. The main problem was that most of the personnel who had the authority to order evacuation had been killed when the first explosion destroyed the control room. This was a consequence of the platform design, including the absence of blast walls. Another contributing factor was that the nearby connected platforms Tartan and Claymore continued to pump gas and oil to Piper Alpha until its pipeline ruptured in the heat in the second explosion.
Their operations crews did not believe they had authority to shut off production, even though they could see that Piper Alpha was burning. The nearby diving support vessel Lowland Cavalier reported the initial explosion just before 22:00, and the second explosion occurred twenty two minutes later. By the time civil and military rescue helicopters reached the scene, flames over one hundred metres in height and visible as far as one hundred km (120 km from the Maersk Highlander) away prevented safe approach. Tharos, a specialist firefighting vessel, was able to approach the platform, but could not prevent the rupture of the Tartan pipeline, about two hours after the start of the disaster, and it was forced to retreat due to the intensity of the fire.
Two crewmen from the standby vessel MV Sandhaven Fast Rescue Craft were killed when an explosion on the platform destroyed their Fast Rescue Craft; the survivor Ian Letham later received the George Medal. The largest number of survivors (37 out of 59) were recovered by the Fast Rescue Craft MV Silver Pit; coxswain James Clark later received the George Medal. Others awarded the George Medal were Charles Haffey from Methil, Andrew Kiloh from Aberdeen, and James McNeill from Oban. The blazing remains of the platform were eventually extinguished three weeks later by a team led by famed firefighter Red Adair, despite reported conditions of 80 mph (130 km/h) winds and 70-foot (20 m) waves. 13] The part of the platform which contained the galley where about 100 victims had taken refuge was recovered in late 1988 from the sea bed, and the bodies of 87 men were found inside The night the sea caught fire: Remembering Piper Alpha. Legacy of accident The Cullen Inquiry was set up in November 1988 to establish the cause of the disaster. In November 1990, it concluded that the initial condensate leak was the result of maintenance work being carried out simultaneously on a pump and related safety valve. The enquiry was critical of Piper Alpha’s operator, Occidental, which was found guilty of having inadequate maintenance and safety procedures. But no criminal charges were ever brought against it.
The second phase of the enquiry made 106 recommendations for changes to North Sea safety procedures, all of which were accepted by industry. Most significant of these recommendations was that the responsibility for enforcing safety in the North Sea should be moved from the Department of Energy to the Health and Safety Executive, as having both production and safety overseen by the same agency was a conflict of interest. The disaster led to insurance claims of around US$ 1. 4 billion, making it at that time the largest insured man-made catastrophe. The insurance and reinsurance claims process revealed serious weaknesses in the way insurers at Lloyd’s of London and elsewhere kept track of their potential exposures, and led to their procedures being reformed.
Survivors and relatives of those who died went on to form the Piper Alpha Families and Survivors Association, which campaigns on North Sea safety issues. Beginning in 1998, one month after the tenth anniversary, Professor David Alexander, director of the Aberdeen Centre for Trauma Research at Robert Gordon University carried out a study into the long-term psychological and social effects of Piper Alpha. He managed to find thirty-six survivors who agreed to give interviews or complete questionnaires. Almost all of this group reported psychological problems. More than 70% of those interviewed reported psychological and behavioral symptoms of post traumatic stress disorder.
Twenty-eight said they had difficulty in finding employment following the disaster; it appears that some offshore employers regarded Piper Alpha survivors as Jonahs – bringers of bad luck, who would not be welcome on other rigs and platforms. The family members of the dead and survived victims also reported various psychological and social problems. Alexander also wrote that “some of these lads are stronger than before Piper. They’ve learned things about themselves, changed their values, some relationships became stronger. People realised they have strengths they didn’t know they had. There was a lot of heroism took place.
There may be a range of possible consequences for a | | |specific | | |event or scenario | |Circumstance |A short-term situation which is relatively unusual eg a storm or when a key person is absent. | |Consultation |A process of seeking information or the informed opinions from one or more people prior to | | |decision-making.
Should particularly include those who may affect the outcomes or be affected by | | |the decisions made, but may also include specialist sources. Consultation does not necessarily | | |mean reaching agreement. | |Data |Raw information which may be numerical or non-numerical. | |Dilution Ventilation |Sometimes called general ventilation. Uncontaminated air is added to contaminated air to reduce | | |the concentration of the contaminant. |Due diligence |The taking of all reasonable precautions in the circumstances to protect the health and safety of | | |employees and others who may be affected by actions or omissions of the individual or corporation. | |Duty of Care |The term “duty of care” or “general duties” describes fairly broad responsibilities for a wide | | |range of parties associated with the work environment and is set out in OHS acts. | |Direct reading device |Equipment that provides a direct readout of a contaminant without further off-site laboratory | | |analysis. |Electromagnetic radiation (EMR) |Electromagnetically propagated radiation that covers a wide spectrum of wavelengths (or | | |frequencies) from very energetic short wavelength gamma rays through X-rays, visible light to | | |microwaves and radio waves. | |Employee |Person by whom work is done under a contract of employment or apprenticeship. | |Employer |Person by whom an employee is employed under a contract of employment or apprenticeship. | |Event |The point in time when a particular set of circumstances occur that results in loss of control of | | |a hazard. |Exposure standard |A quantitative guideline, or level set for concentrations of workplace contaminants to which, | | |according to current knowledge, most workers may be exposed without impairment to health or undue | | |discomfort. | |Fume |Mix of particulates in air where the particulates are extremely small and are generally produced | | |by processes such as combustion or condensation. | |Hazard |Hazard, in relation to a person, means anything that may result in injury to the person or harm to| | |the health of the person. | | | | |A source of potential harm in terms of human injury, ill-heath, damage to property, the | | |environment or a combination of these. | | |A source of potentially damaging energy. | |Hazard identification |The process of identifying sources of harm. | |Hierarchy of control |The priority order in which hazard and risk controls should be considered with the eventual | | |outcome often being a combination of measures.
The prime emphasis is on: | | |elimination; and where this is not practicable, minimisation of risk by: | | |substitution; and | | |engineering controls, including isolating the hazard from personnel; then, when these options have| | |been implemented as far as is practicable by: | | |administrative controls (eg, procedures; training); and | | |personal protective equipment (PPE). | |Incident |An event that has caused or has the potential for injury, ill-health or damage. (Note that | | |‘incident’ is the preferred term rather than ‘accident’). Refer also to ‘occurrence’. | | | | | |Unplanned consequence of events, or a missing or inappropriate response. | |Any occurrence/event arising out of and in the course of employment which results in personal or | | |property damage. | | |EMR containing enough energy to dislodge electrons and so break chemical bonds and cause chemical | |Ionising radiation |changes. Can cause damage to living tissue. | |Investigation |A systematic process of gathering and analysing information to identify the cause(s) of an | | |incident. |Job Safety Analysis (JSA) |The process of breaking a task down into its key components and examining the hazards of each | | |component to identify the required controls. The output of a JSA can be used in the development of| | |written job instructions. | |Jurisdiction |Geographic area or division of industry or the community in which government has the power and | | |authority to administer and apply certain laws. |Key person |Person, not a stakeholder, who influences decisions on OHS or may be affected by OHS decisions. | |Key personnel |People involved in OHS decision-making or those who are affected by OHS decisions. | |Lag indicator |Refer to negative performance indicator. | |Lead indicator |Refer to positive performance indicator. | |Latency |Period that elapses between exposure and appearance of the first signs and symptoms of a disease. | |Likelihood |A colloquial term for ‘probability’.
When related to risk, it is the probability of the stated | | |consequence occurring, not the likelihood of the hazard or the particular scenario. | | |Likelihood is affected by how often and how long the person (or structure etc) is exposed to the | | |hazard and the reliability of the controls in place. | |Local exhaust ventilation (LEV) |Collects contaminants close to the source and is preferred to dilution or general ventilation. | |Lost time injury and diseases (LTI/D) |Fatality, permanent disability or injury involving time lost from work of one day/shift or more. |Mechanism of incident or injury |The process that best describes the circumstances in which the injury/disease occurred (Safe Work | | |Australia, formerly ASCC/NOHSC, 2004c). | |Medical treatment injury |Injury or condition requiring medical treatment but no time lost from work. | |Mist |Fine liquid droplets suspended in air. Usually generated by condensation from a gaseous to liquid | | |state or by breaking up a liquid into a dispersed state by splashing foaming or atomising. |Near miss |A situation where no one is injured or damaged, but this could have been the case. | |Negative performance indicators |Typically focus on measurement of loss such as LTI/D, and costs of injury. Also called outcome or | | |lag indicators as the time required for trends to become apparent usually ‘lag’ well behind | | |implementation of initiatives. | |Non-Disturbance Occurrence |A serious incident requiring the non-disturbance of the incident scene for a defined period of | | |time. |Nomogram |An alignment chart arranged so that the value of a variable can be found without calculation from | | |the value of one or two other variables that are known. | |Occupational Health and Safety |Also known as Workplace Health and Safety | |OHS Committees |Provisions for OHS committees are set out in OHS legislation under each jurisdiction. Workplaces | | |may also design their own arrangements for committees, once legal requirements have been met. |OHS Legislative Framework |OHS legislation – acts, regulations, codes of practice, guidance notes (may include A/NZ Standards| | |referenced in regulations or codes of practice). | |
OHS policies and procedures |Documents underpinning the OHS plan and action plans that describe how, for example, tasks, | | |inspections, jobs and processes are to be undertaken. | |OHS Representatives |Provisions for OHS representatives are set out in OHS legislation under each jurisdiction. | |Occurrence |Process(es) which gives rise to damage, injury or ill-health. |Participative arrangements |Arrangements that ensure a range of individuals and groups participate in OHS decision-making in | | |the workplace. For example, OHS committees, OHS representatives, special OHS project groups, | | |employee and supervisor involvement in OHS inspections, audits, hazard reporting, team-based risk | | |assessments. | |Passive sampling |Collecting samples of an airborne contaminant by exposing a medium to the contaminated air. |Performance indicator |A statistic or other unit of information which reflects directly or indirectly the extent to which| | |an anticipated outcome is achieved or the quality of processes leading to that outcome (New South | | |Wales Health Department in (Safe Work Australia, formerly ASCC/NOHSC, 1999). | |Plant |Includes any machinery, equipment, appliance, implement or tool and any component, fitting or | | |accessory. |Positive performance indicators (PPI) |Focus on monitoring the processes that should produce good OHS outcomes. Also called lead | | |indicators or ‘drivers’ as they measure the activities that drive good OHS performance. | |Potentiate |Occur where one risk factor or agent does not have an effect, but when added to another increases | | |the risk associated the latter. | |Procedures |Documents that describe an approach and method for undertaking certain activities or processes. | |Those relevant to OHS may include: | | |hazard and incident reporting, OHS communication, consultation, issue resolution and risk | | |management; | | |standard operating procedures, work instructions; | | |operators manuals; | | |employee and contractor handbooks; | | |job/task statements; | | |documents describing how tasks, projects, inspections, jobs and processes are to be undertaken; | | |quality system documentation; and | | |• purchasing and contracting procedures. |Psychosocial hazards |Sources of potential harm that are related to the way work is organised, the relationships or | | |interactions which operate | | |within the work environment or specific events that may lead to post-traumatic stress. | |Qualitative data |Is ‘non quantifiable’. It attempts to explain the ways people come to account for, take action and| | |otherwise manage their day to day situations. With qualitative research, most analysis is done | | |with words.
Some typical methods of qualitative data sources are observation, open ended or | | |unstructured interviews and conversational analysis. | |Quantitative data |Can be measured or a number applied and variables correlated (eg, through use of statistics). Some| | |typical sources of quantitative data are injury statistics, measurements of airborne contaminants | | |and noise surveys. Questionnaires also give quantitative results. | |Random errors |Occur in monitoring and can arise at any time. They are difficult to predict and quantify.
For | | |example, excess loading of dust on a filter will increase the back pressure and cause the pump to | | |slow; or dust may be lost from the surface of a filter due to poor handling; the volume of reagent| | |placed in a bubbler may be slightly too great, etc. | |Receptor (as in LEV) |LEV systems in which the contaminants are released within the hood or find their own way into the | | |hood, eg laboratory fume cupboards and spray booths. | |Reliability of data |The consistency or repeatability of the information. | |Risk |The potential for unwanted, negative consequences of an event. |Risk assessment |A process to develop an understanding of the hazard and its associated risk involving analysing a | | |hazard to: | | |identify factors influencing the risk and the range of potential consequences; | | |evaluate the effectiveness of existing controls; | | |estimate the likelihood of the consequence, considering exposure and hazard level; and combining | | |these in some way to obtain a level of risk or to prioritise the risk for action. |Risk ranking |A document detailing: | | |a list of hazards, their location and people exposed; | | |a range of possible scenarios or circumstances under which these hazards may cause injury or | | |damage; | | |nature of injury or damage caused; | | |the results of the risk assessment; and may also include | | |possible control measures and dates for implementation. | | |Sometimes called a ‘Hazard Register’ but this is a narrow term implying the inclusion of only | | |limited information relating to the sources of risk rather than the consequences and control | | |measures. |Risk register |A document detailing: | | |a list of hazards, their location and people exposed; | | |a range of possible scenarios or circumstances under which these hazards may cause injury or | | |damage; | | |nature of injury or damage caused; | | |the results of the risk assessment; | | | | | |and may also include: | | |possible control measures and dates for implementation. | | | | |Sometimes called a ‘Hazard Register’, but this is a narrow term implying the inclusion of only | | |limited information relating to the sources of risk rather than the consequences of the risk and | | |control measures. | |Root cause |A condition or circumstance that leads to an event which is identified by following the chain of | | |causation back to the most distant cause that is controllable. | | | | |The actions or deficiencies which allowed the direct cause to exist. These are usually the | | |underlying causes of an incident. | |Root Cause Analysis |A quality tool applying a multiple “why? ” analysis, which is directed at identifying all causes | | |responsible for an incident. | |Stakeholders |Those people or organisations who may be affected by, or perceive themselves to be affected by, an| | |activity or decision.
In workplace OHS, stakeholders include: | | |managers; | | |supervisors; | | |health and safety and other employee representatives; | | |OHS committees; | | |employees and contractors; and | | |the community. | |Statistic |A number calculated from data that quantifies a particular set of data. | | |Interaction of two or more risk factors or agents where the combined effect is greater than the | |Synergistic |sum of their separate effects. |Systematic approach |Comprehensive processes that are combined in a methodical and ordered manner to minimise the risk | | |of injury or ill health in the workplace. A process of design and planning, implementation, | | |monitoring, review and evaluation for ongoing improvement. | | |May occur in monitoring and, when they occur, they arise each time sampling is undertaken and are,| |Systematic errors |to some extent, predictable and quantifiable. For example, an inaccurately calibrated pump will | | |produce the same error in measured sample volume every time it is used until re-calibrated. |Time-weighted average (TWA) |An amount or quantity expressed as a concentration, level or dose that represents the length of | | |exposure to a potentially harmful agent averaged over a stated period of time, ie eight-hour day. | |Total recordable injuries |Are all injuries that are recorded in the workplace. This usually includes first aid treatments, | | |medical treatment injuries and lost time injuries/diseases. | |Vapour |Gaseous phase of a substance which is liquid at normal temperature and pressure. |Workplace Health and Safety |Also known as Occupational Health and Safety | |Work related injury |The result of a single traumatic event where the harm or hurt is immediately apparent, for example| | |a cut resulting from an incident with a knife or burns resulting from an acid splash (Safe Work | | |Australia, formerly ASCC/NOHSC, 2004c). | |Work related disease |Usually results from repeated or long-term exposure to an agent or event ? for example, loss of | | |hearing as a result of long-term exposure to noise; from a single exposure to an infectious agent;| | |or from multiple or uncertain causes (Safe Work Australia, formerly ASCC/NOHSC, 2004c). | SECTION G – GENERAL OHS INFORMATION OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND SAFETY Occupational health and safety is a cross-disciplinary area concerned with protecting the safety, health and welfare of people engaged in work or employment.
The goal of all occupational health and safety programs is to foster a safe work environment. en. wikipedia. org/wiki/Occupational_health_and_safety Is another way of saying ‘Health and Safety at Work’. It’s about preventing disease or injury that is a direct result of your workplace. www. safehands. ie/glossary. htm It’s better to deal with health and safety issues before they become a problem – a planned approach to safety is essential for your business. Safety shouldn’t be seen as an additional cost – it is a necessary and essential component of your business. Under OHS legislation you are obliged to provide: • safe premises • safe machinery and materials safe systems of work • information, instruction, training and supervision • a suitable working environment and facilities. If you don’t comply with these legal requirements you can be prosecuted and fined. Workplace health and safety authorities in each state and territory and Safe Work Australia have responsibilities for enforcing the OHS legislation. They provide information and advice on safety and health at work and education and training. You can get information about your OHS obligations and other valuable OHS resources both in hard copy and online from their websites. Please note that legal obligations of employers vary according to circumstances.
You may wish to seek independent legal advice on what is applicable to your situation. www. business. gov. au OHS Acts, Regulations and Codes of Practice OHS Acts In Australia, states and territories have responsibility for making laws about occupational health and safety (OHS) and for enforcing those laws. Each state and territory has a principal OHS Act, setting out requirements for ensuring that workplaces are safe and healthy. These requirements spell out the duties of different groups of people who play a role in workplace health and safety. OHS Regulations and Codes of Practice Some workplace hazards have the potential to cause so much injury or disease that specific regulations or codes of practice are warranted.
These regulations and codes, adopted under state and territory OHS Acts, explain the duties of particular groups of people in controlling the risks associated with specific hazards. There is a difference between regulations and codes: • Regulations are legally enforceable. • Codes of Practice provide advice on how to meet regulatory requirements. Codes are not legally enforceable, but they can be used in courts as evidence that legal requirements have or have not been met. NEW NATIONAL WORKPLACE HEALTH AND SAFETY LAWS The model Work Health and Safety (WHS) Act is the result of a comprehensive national review into work health and safety laws across Australia. Details of the Act can be found at http://www. comlaw. gov. au/Details/C2011A00137
Many States have already agreed to the harmonisation of workplace health and safety laws with details of how each state is undertaking this process available at the relevant website for each listed below. NSWhttp://www. workcover. nsw. gov. au/newlegislation2012/Pages/default. aspx ACThttp://www. worksafe. act. gov. au/health_safety QLDhttp://www. deir. qld. gov. au/workplace/law/whslaws/index. htm TAShttp://www. wst. tas. gov. au/ VIC http://www. worksafe. vic. gov. au/wps/wcm/connect/wsinternet/WorkSafe/Home/ NThttp://www. worksafe. nt. gov. au/home. aspx WAhttp://www. safetyline. wa. gov. au/index. html SAhttp://www. safework. sa. gov. au/ Corresponding WHS law Means each of the following: a) the Work Health and Safety Act 2011 of New South Wales; (b) the Work Health and Safety Act 2011 of Victoria; (c) the Work Health and Safety Act 2011 of Queensland; (d) the Work Health and Safety Act 2011 of Western Australia; (e) the Work Health and Safety Act 2011 of South Australia; (f) the Work Health and Safety Act 2011 of Tasmania; (g) the Work Health and Safety Act 2011 of the Australian Capital Territory; (h) the Work Health and Safety Act 2011 of the Northern Territory; (i) any other law of a State or Territory prescribed by the regulations Useful links as of March 2011 Austlii Site www. austlii. edu. au Dept of Workplace Relations www. dwrsb. gov. au Australian Industrial Relations Commission www. airc. gov. au Industrial Relations NSW www. dir. nsw. gov. au National Occupational Health & Safety Commission www. nohsc. gov. au QLD Workcover www. detir. qld. gov. au TAS Workplace Standards www. wsa. tas. gov. au NSW Workcover www. workcover. nsw. gov. au SA Workcover www. orkcover. sa. gov. au WA Workcover www. safetyline. wa. gov. au NT Workcover www. nt. gov. au VIC Workcover www. workcover. vic. gov. au QLD Workplace Health Safety www. whs. qld. gov. au QLD Workers Compensation www. workcover. qld. gov. au OSIRIS www. osiris. gov. au Common and statute law The term common law refers to a system of law originally derived in England and imported into Australia at the time of colonisation. Common law is based on sets of rules developed by judges usually hearing cases in superior courts. Common law is also referred to as case law and can be viewed as legal rules not contained in legislation. Statute law is legislation.
The word legislation refers to both statutes and delegated legislation such as regulations and by-laws. Statutes or acts are made by parliaments. The differences between common and statute law are important as Judges through the common law court system, could be seen as making decisions in order to resolve specific disputes between various parties. E. g. If a worker is injured at his/her workplace a court will decide on the question of blame and what compensation is owed. This is a reactive system of law. Legislation has the potential to be pro-active and may serve to prevent the worker from becoming injured in the first place. Legislation is much more flexible than common law and always takes precedence over it.
Parliament has the power to change any rules deriving from case law that may be considered undesirable. The courts play an important role in ensuring that legislative bodies follow proper procedures upon making legislation and are charged with the responsibility of resolving disputes which may arise over the meaning of words in the legislation. Source: Taylor Easter Hegney, (2001) Enhancing Safety A Workplace Guide 1 Third Edition Duty of care (level of responsibility) Under OHS legislation, organisations have certain legal obligations to their employees, contractors and clients. Individuals also have personal obligations as employees and in their work role.
These state-based legislated responsibilities derive from the duty of care to ensure a safe place of work, safe systems of work, and safe and adequate tools and equipment together with competent workers. Duty of care places into a legal form a moral duty to anticipate possible causes of injury and illness and to do everything reasonably practicable to remove or minimise these possible causes of harm. Many people in the workplace have a role in occupational health and safety. The individual roles are determined by the duty of care that has developed through common law and the legislated responsibilities that are based on common law but are rules determined by the parliament. The approach to responsibilities taken in both common law and the OHS legislation is that the responsibility sits with those who have the control.
The Board and the Manager have ultimate responsibility for occupational health and safety because they have the decision-making control. But the people who spend most time in safety-related activities are the supervisors and shop floor personnel. Occupational health and safety is a shared responsibility. Depending on your situation, there will be a number of people involved. These might include: • your workplace manager, coordinator or supervisor • a director of the organisation • the employer • the Health and Safety Advisor in your workplace • Human Resources personnel. Don’t forget, everyone has a role to play too but the level of their control may be minimal.
A work environment, whether it is a factory, classroom, shop floor or work placement, is also governed by that duty of care. Therefore, your organisation must recognise and act upon this duty of care. The level of responsibility can be represented by the following triangles. |Activities required to meet this responsibility may |[pic] | |be delegated but the responsibility itself cannot be| | |delegated. Thus, a manager may delegate activities | | |such as training to a supervisor, but they still | | |have the responsibility to ensure that the training | | |is actually conducted and is of an appropriate | | |standard. | | | | | |[pic] | | | | | | | | | | |Thus, the actual time involved in occupational | | |health and safety is not always relative to the | | |level of responsibility. Rather, it is shown by | | |turning the triangle back on its base. | NOTE: Volunteers and other non-paid workers are still covered by Workplace Health and Safety Legislation and organisations still have a duty of care and may be liable for workers compensation and or other payments. What are the roles of key OHS/WHS organisations? The main organisations that administer or are otherwise responsible for the functioning of the OHS Act and their roles are: Worksafe Australia – ‘To ensure that employer and employer associations, employees and trade unions and governments are involved in and support the common adoption of world best practice systems and national standards for workplace health and safety’.
WorkCover (This is the Victorian authority for an example of a State organisation) – ‘To improve workplace health and safety for workers, employers and the community by coordinating and supporting the delivery of prevention, rehabilitation and compensation services. ’ (Other State OHS organisations will have a similar role to this). ComCare – ‘To take a leading role in the reduction of the human and financial costs of workplace injury and, by working with their customers, prevent injuries and return injured employees to work’. What are the responsibilities of employer and employee? Every employer has a duty to each employee to ‘ensure so far as is reasonably practicable that the employee is, while at work, safe from injury and risks to health’. This includes taking action to control the risks that occur in the workplace.
Some of the detailed responsibilities of employers are: • Provide and maintain a safe working environment • Provide and maintain safe systems at work • Provide and maintain machinery, equipment, appliances, implements, tools and substances in a safe condition. Employees must take reasonable care to protect their own health and safety and the health and safety of others who may be affected by their actions or omissions at work. What are the roles of OHS committees, representatives and unions? OHS committees are a representative group within the workplace that provides a forum to discuss and resolve OHS matters. The general way they are formed and operate is: The people on the committee are elected by the group they are representing ? They allow management and employees to meet regularly to discuss and solve health and safety issues in their particular work location ? They allow the use of both the employees’ practical experience of risks in the workplace, and management’s knowledge of organisations and processes ? They can be used to decide local policies and procedures, and to resolve OHS/WHS disputes. OHS/WHS representatives are elected for a period of three years and they, or their employer, must notify the OHS/WHS Authority of their appointment so that they can be kept up to date on OHS/WHS matters as they occur.
Representatives can be involved in the following activities: ? Inspection of the workplace as a routine inspection or because of an accident or incident requiring immediate action ? Discuss problems or conduct investigations usually in company with management, other OHS/WHS committee members and/or a suitable consultant ? Accompany a Department of Industrial Relations (DIR) inspector during visits ? Obtain access to OHS/WHS information on activities and workers ? Investigate OHS/WHS complaints. The ‘Designated Work Group’ (DWG) is a small organisation within the workplace which can be established to represent their particular area, role or tasks. The groups operate in the following way: Trade unions work with employers to decide how many groups there should be in the workplace. The number of groups will depend on the size of the workplace and the types of work being carried out. ? Each DWG can elect one OHS/WHS representative. Elections are organised by the workplace union ? Not every DWG needs to have a representative, nor does a workplace need DWG’s. This is decided for each workplace depending on the needs agreed between management, unions and the workers. The relevant workplace unions also have a responsibility towards OHS/WHS. They assist in the monitoring of safe working practices and provide another avenue for any dispute resolution.
The union can also be involved in the running of elections for representatives and committees The three steps in accident prevention The three steps in accident prevention are: [pic] Remember, consultation is an important element of all three steps. The process used by organisations to identify, evaluate and control hazards is called risk management. Organisations have to continually: • identify hazards • assess the risk of illness and injury from the hazards • implement control measures to eliminate or mitigate the effects of the hazards. RISK MANAGEMENT (RM) Risk Management (RM) is a five step process for controlling exposure to health and safety risks associated with hazards in the workplace. The five steps in the process are: |[pic] | |STEP 1 – IDENTIFY HAZARDS | | | | | |STEP 2 – ASSESS RISKS | | | | | |STEP 3 – DECIDE ON CONTROL MEASURES | | | | | |STEP 4 – IMPLEMENT CONTROL MEASURES | | | | | |STEP 5 – MONITOR & REVIEW | |
In many cases risk management is nothing more than a careful examination of what could cause harm to people in your workplace and: • weighing up whether you have taken enough precautions or • should do more to prevent harm, and • controlling exposure to prevent harm. When undertaking risk management: • Involve workers in the process. • Don’t use it to justify a decision that has already been made. • Consider good practice in your industry. • Make records of any risk management activities undertaken. You can access information about OHS/WHS at (accessed January 2005). The way this process is implemented at your workplace will depend on the type of work undertaken and the nature of hazards and risks in the workplace.
Although this standard details each step in the process separately, in practice you may find that some steps overlap. For example, a single inspection of the workplace can allow identification of a hazard and assess the level of associated risk at the same time. When undertaking this process, try to be objective and practical. Consider what actually happens in the workplace, not only what a manual can specify should happen. Take advantage of existing control measures and make sure all relevant hazards are addressed. HIERARCHY OF HAZARD CONTROL [pic] Examples of workplace hazards Occupational hazards can be physical, chemical, biological, mechanical or psychological. The following table shows some examples of each of these types of hazard. Physical |Noise |Underfoot conditions | | |Hot or cold objects |Electricity | | |Hot or cold environments |Working in exposed weather conditions | | |Fluids under pressure |Vibration | | |Airborne particulates |Falling or flying objects | | |Mobile plant or load shifting equipment |Radiation | | |Machinery with moving parts |Sharp or cutting edges | |Chemical |Hazardous substances |Combustible materials | | |Dangerous goods |Fire | | |Hazardous atmosphere |Explosions | |Biological |Pathogens |Spiders, insects, snakes | | Microorganisms |Large animals | |Ergonomic |Manual handling |Fatigue | | |High repetition work practices |Work postures | |Psycho-social |Workload |Role clarification | | |Fatigue/shift work |Interpersonal relationships | WHAT IS A HAZARD A Hazard is anything that can cause harm, injury, damage, loss, incapacity, or death.
Following are various sites available to you, depending on which state or territory you work, providing information on hazards and their associated risks. • www. workcover. nsw. gov. au/… /HazardsWorkingEnvironment/… /default. aspx • www. education. vic. gov. au/[email protected]/workplace_hazards. asp • www. workplaceohs. com. au/Hazards. asp • www. deir. qld. gov. au/workplace/business/… /otherhaz • www. safework. sa. gov. au/… /IdentifyingHazards/stuHazardControl. htm • www. youngworkers. com. au/… /protecting_young_workers_from_workplace_hazards A hazard is anything with the potential to cause harm to life, health or property. For example, cluttered and unmarked walkways are a hazard in a workplace. They increase the risk of injury.
A hazard does not change from being a hazard because of location or circumstance: For example, a nail sticking out of a wall no matter where it is located is still a hazard. The difference is that a nail sticking out of the wall in a well-used doorway is more likely to cause someone injury than a nail sticking out of the wall near the ceiling. The likelihood of injury is different, but both are still hazards. What are physical hazards? A hazard can be defined as a situation that can be dangerous to people or can cause damage. Physical hazards are dangers in the workplace such as: o Noise and vibration o Extremes of temperature and humidity o The condition and design (ergonomics) of furniture and equipment The condition of the workplace, such as: o Congestion o Clutter o Waste material buildup o Poor lighting and visibility. How can chemical hazards be caused? Chemical hazards can be caused by: o Poor ventilation causing a risk from: o Gases – breathing in, touching the skin or from explosions o Fumes o Vapours o Dust o Liquids – from swallowing, slipping on spills or from liquids catching fire o Mineral fibres. What contributes to behavioral hazards? Behavioral hazards are caused by the way workers do their job. This applies to such things as attitude, concentration, and effort applied by the worker. The main things that contribute to behavioral hazards are: Improvisation, for example, taking ‘short cuts’ or using the wrong equipment to carry out tasks o Carelessness o Poor health – this affects judgement, strength and concentration o Incorrect techniques o Inexperience o Poor or no training. How can hazards be fixed or avoided? There are a number of ways that the hazards described above can be avoided or solved. For example: – Using safe working practices by: o Following the guidance given in OHS/WHS regulations and Codes of Practice o Knowing and using the information in procedures and operator manuals o Doing your work in an orderly way o Reporting, and correcting where possible, any activities that are a risk to workers. Workplaces should be laid out in a well planned way which would include: o Emergency equipment o First aid o Clearly marked exits o Marked walkways o Clear access and aisles o Guardrails o Signposts o Separate amenities. WHAT IS A RISK Risk is the probability (likelihood) that the hazard will actually result in injury or disease. For example, the probability of a sprained or broken limb is increased if walkways are cluttered and unmarked. A major role for supervisors in occupational health and safety is identifying hazards in the workplace and eliminating or minimising the risks they pose. Some hazards may be obvious and immediate in their effect. They may be simple to deal with, for example water on the floor.
But many hazards are ‘hidden’, for example dust, and therefore may take time to have an effect. So we need to identify the different types of hazards in the workplace. We do this by: ? Regular inspections ? Accident and sickness records ? Accident investigation. Risk control Risk is the probability that the hazard will actually result in injury or disease. Under the OHS/WHS legislation, you are required to introduce new control measures to eliminate the risk, or if that is not reasonably practicable, to reduce the risk so far as is reasonably practicable, if the current measures are found to be inadequate and there is a likelihood that injury, illness or disease will result from a particular situation.
The term “reasonably practicable” has a particular meaning under the OHS/WHS legislation. It means practicable having regard to: • The likelihood of a hazard or risk occurring (i. e. the probability of a person being exposed to harm); • The degree of harm that would result if the hazard or risk occurred (i. e the potential seriousness of injury or harm); • What the person concerned knows, or ought reasonably know, about the hazard or risk and any ways of eliminating or reducing that hazard or risk; • The availability and suitability of ways to eliminate or reduce the hazard or risk; and • The cost of eliminating or reducing the hazard or risk.
Calculating the level of risk using a Risk Matrix: LIKELIHOOD OF INCIDENT OCCURRING |Level |Descriptor |Description |Probability Assessment | |A |Almost certain |The incident is Expected to occur in Most Circumstances while doing |1:1 | | | |this or a similar job or activity | | |B |Likely |The incident will Probably occur in Most Circumstances while doing |1:10 | | |this or a similar job or activity | | |C |Moderate |The incident Should occur at Some Time while doing this or a similar |1:1,000 | | | |job or activity | | |D |Unlikely |The incident Could occur at Some Time while doing this or a similar |1:10,000 | | | |job or activity | | |E |Rare |The incident May occur only in Exceptional Circumstances while doing |1:1,000,000 | | | |this or a similar job or activity | | MOST LIKELY CONSEQUENCE Level |Descriptor |Description | |1 |Insignificant |Minor injury not requiring first aid treatment | |2 |Minor |First aid treatment | |3 |Moderate |Medical treatment required | |4 |Major |Permanent disability | |5 |Catastrophic |Death | QUALITATIVE RISK ANALYSIS MATRIX LEVEL OF RISK | |Consequences | |Likelihood |1 |2 |3 4 |5 | |of the |Insignificant |Minor |Moderate |Major |Catastrophic | |Incident |Minor injury |First aid |Medical |Permanent |Death | |occurring |not requiring |Treatment |Treatment |Disability | | | |first aid |required |required |injury | | | |treatment | | | | | |A |M |S |H |H |H | |Almost certain | | | | | | |B |M |S |S |H |H | |Likely | | | | | | |C |Low |Moderate |Significant |High Risk |H | |Moderate |Risk |Risk |Risk | | | |D |L |L |M |S |H | |Unlikely | | | | | | |E |L |L |L |M |S | |Rare | | | | | | Key: Extreme
An extreme risk requires immediate action as the potential could be devastating to the organisation. High A high level of risk requires action, as it has the potential to be damaging to the organisation. Moderate Allocate specific responsibility to a moderate risk and implement monitoring or response procedures. Low Treat a low level of risk with routine procedures. THE WORKPLACE HEALTH AND SAFETY RISK MANAGEMENT PROCESS [pic] [pic] The risk control process must be carried out in consultation with the relevant health and safety representatives and employees. In identifying new risk control measures, the most effective form of control measures is to eliminate the risk (eg by eliminating the process).
If that is not reasonably practicable you need to identify effective measures to reduce the risk. The OHS/WHS legislation specifies that you must not depend solely on the use of administrative controls or personal protective equipment to reduce the risk unless that you have established that the following are not practicable measures: • Substituting the plant or substance with another one that is less hazardous • Using engineering controls (eg modifying the design of the workplace or plant, or environmental conditions) • Isolating people from the source of exposure • Changing the objects used in the task involving manual handling • Using mechanical aids for manual handling tasks
The way this process is implemented at your workplace will depend on the type of work undertaken and the nature of hazards and risks in the workplace. Although this standard details each step in the process separately, in practice you may find that some steps overlap. For example, a single inspection of the workplace can allow identification of a hazard and assess the level of associated risk at the same time. When undertaking this process, try to be objective and practical. Consider what actually happens in the workplace, not only what a manual can specify should happen. Take advantage of existing control measures and make sure all relevant hazards are addressed.
Before any decision is taken as to which type of risk control measures ought to be used, consideration should be given to the severity of injury, illness or disease that could occur. If the severity is high (i. e. fatality, serious injury etc), a higher hierarchy order of control (i. e. elimination, substitution, engineering controls, isolation) should be used. Sometimes they may have to be used in combination with administrative controls and in some cases personal protective equipment. It is not always reasonably practicable to immediately implement the higher hierarchy of control and there may still be a need to keep the process/activity going. In such situations interim control measures (in the